

Costas Lapavitsas is Professor of Economics aan de School of Oriental and African Studies, Universiteit van London.
Meer over Costas LapavitsasCrisis in the Eurozone
Samenvatting
Eerst was er de kredietcrisis, en regeringen over de hele wereld staken zich in de schulden om de banken te redden. De opvolger van dat debacle is de schuldencrisis.
Costas Lapavitsas stelt in dit boek dat de Europese soberheid contraproductief is. Bezuinigingen op de overheidsuitgaven zullen leiden tot een langere, diepere recessie, grotere schuldenlast en instabielere banken.
Specificaties
Inhoudsopgave
Acknowledgements
Introduction: The End of Europeanism by Stathis Kouvelakis
Glossary
PART 1: BEGGAR THYSELF AND THY NEIGHBOUR
Several dimensions of a public debt crisis
Macroeconomic performance: Stagnation in Germany, bubbles in the periphery
Labour remuneration and productivity: A general squeeze, but more effective in Germany
International transactions: Trade and capital flows in the shadow of Germany
Rising public sector borrowing: Dealing with failed banks and worsening recession
The financial sector: How to create a global crisis and then benefit from it
Political economy of alternative strategies to deal with the crisis
PART 2: THE EUROZONE BETWEEN AUSTERITY AND DEFAULT
Introduction
A profusion of debt: If you cannot compete, keep borrowing
Rescuing the banks once again
Society pays the price: Austerity and further liberalisation
The spectre of default in Europe
Appendix 2A: The crisis last time: Argentina and Russia
Appendix 2B: Construction of aggregate debt profiles
Appendix 2C: Decomposition of aggregate demand
PART 3: BREAKING UP? A RADICAL ROUTE OUT OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS
Hitting the buffers
Monetary disunion: Institutional malfunctioning and power relations
Failing austerity: Class interests and institutional fixes
Centrifugal finance: Re-strengthened links between banks and nation states
The social and political significance of breaking up
Default and exit: Cutting the Gordian knot
Index