Empiricism and Philosophy of Physics

<div>Preface</div><div><br></div><div>Part I. Background</div><div>1. Problems in Philosophy of Physics</div><div>1.1 Introduction</div><div>1.2 Philosophical Questions in Physics</div><div>1.3 Summary and General Methodology</div><div><br></div><div>2. Some Important Episodes in the History of Physics</div><div>2.1 Introduction</div><div>2.2 Aristotle’s Physics</div><div>2.3 From Aristotle’s Physics to Classical Mechanics: Galilei and Newton</div><div>2.4 Relativity Theory</div><div>2.5 Quantum Theory</div><div><br></div>Part II. General Philosophy of Science<div>3. Empiricism from Ockham to van Fraassen</div><div>3.1 Introduction</div><div>3.2 Medieval Nominalism - an Empiricist Position</div><div>3.3 Classical Empiricism</div><div>3.4 Empiricism During the 19th Century</div><div>3.4.1 Mach</div>3.4.2 Poincaré<div>3.5 The Vienna Circle</div><div>3.6 Quine</div><div>3.7 Van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism</div><div>3.7.1 Van Fraassen’s Empiricist Stance</div><div>3.8 Evidence</div><div>3.8.1 Evidence and Reasons</div><div>3.8.2 Empirical Evidence</div><div>3.8.3 Is Inconsistency Counter-Evidence Against a Theory?</div><div>3.9 Classification - Natural Kinds</div><div>3.10 My Empiricist Stance</div><div><br></div><div>4. Mathematical Knowledge and Mathematical Objects</div><div>4.1 Introduction</div><div>4.2 Kant and Quine on Objects</div><div>4.3 Truth Value Gaps in Mathematics</div><div>4.4 Are Numbers Universals?</div><div>4.5 From Natural Numbers to Reals</div><div>4.5.1 Against Reduction of Mathematics to Set Theory</div><div>4.5.2 Platonism Versus Constructivism and Reals</div><div>4.6 Constructions of Numbers</div><div>4.6.1 Constructions of integers and rationals</div><div>4.6.2 Reals and Infinity</div><div>4.6.3 Constructive Analysis</div><div>4.7 Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem and the Law of Excluded Middle</div><div>4.8 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>5. Induction and Concept Formation</div><div>5.1 Induction in the naturalistic perspective</div>5.2 Justification in the Naturalistic Perspective<div>5.3 Evidence and Justification</div><div>5.4 Induction and concept formation</div><div>5.5 Induction as a heuristic device</div><div>5.6 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>6. Explanation, Unification and Reduction</div><div>6.1 Introduction</div><div>6.2 Friedman on Unification</div><div>6.3 Nagel on Theory Reduction</div><div>6.4 Explanation and Understanding</div><div>6.5 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>7. Realism, Theory-Equivalence and Underdetermination of Theories</div><div>7.1 The Physical Content of Theories</div><div>7.2 Arguments About Scientific Realism</div><div>7.2.1 Defusing Underdetermination</div><div>7.2.2 Structural Realism</div><div>7.3 Existence</div><div>7.4 Are Physical Quantities Real?</div><div>7.4.1 Universals</div><div>7.4.2 Physical Quantities</div>7.5 The Use of ‘Model’ in physics<div>7.6 Theories of Principle vs Constructive Theories</div><div>7.7 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>Part III. Philosophy of Physics</div><div>8 Causation in Physics</div><div>8.1 Introduction</div><div>8.2 Causes and Laws</div><div>8.2.1 Causation and Relativity Theory</div><div>8.3 Are Forces Causes?</div><div>8.4 Cause is Agent-Related</div><div>8.5 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>9. Space, Time and Body; Three Fundamental Concepts</div><div>9.1 Observations</div><div>9.2 How Does a Theory Connect to the World?</div><div>9.3 The Interdependence Between the Predicates place, time and body</div><div>9.3.1 Bodies and Particles</div><div>9.4 Fundamental Quantities</div><div>9.5 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>10. Laws</div><div>10.1 Introduction</div><div>10.2 The Extension of the Predicate “Law of Nature”</div><div>10.3 The Logical Form of Laws</div><div>10.4 Semantics and ontology</div><div>10.5 Induction, Concept Formation and Discovery of Fundamental Laws</div><div>10.5.1 Laws, Physical Theories and Observations: Top-Down or Bottom-Up?</div><div>10.6 Laws and Fundamental Quantities in Classical Mechanics</div>10.6.1 The Discovery of Momentum Conservation and the Introduction of mass and force<div>10.6.2 Types of Laws in Classical Mechanics</div><div>10.7 Laws in Special Theory of Relativity</div><div>10.8 Laws of Electromagnetism</div><div>10.9 Fundamental Laws that Do Not Introduce New Quantities</div><div>10.10 Lawhood and Necessity</div><div>10.11 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>11. Electromagnetism: Fields or Particles?</div><div>11.1 Introduction: What is Real: Fields, Particles or Both?</div><div>11.2 Ontological Commitment</div><div>11.2.1 Alternating the Ontology of a Theory</div><div>11.3 Semantics of Classical Electromagnetism</div><div>11.4 Inconsistency of Classical Electromagnetism?</div><div>11.5 Why Not a Double Ontology?</div><div>11.6 What Do We Observe?</div><div>11.7 Relativistic Quantum Electrodynamics</div><div>11.8 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>12. Propensities</div><div>12.1 Introduction</div><div>12.2 Objectivity and Chanciness</div><div>12.3 Indeterminism and Objective Chance</div><div>12.4 Conditional Propensities</div><div>12.5 Conditionals vs Conditional Probabilities</div><div>12.6 The Scope of Genuine Randomness</div><div>12.7 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>13. Direction of Time</div><div>13.1 Introduction</div><div>13.2 Time Reversal and Dynamics of Motion</div><div>13.2.1 Time Reversal in Classical Mechanics</div><div>13.2.2 CPT Symmetry</div><div>13.2.3 Time Asymmetry in Weak Interactions</div><div>13.2.4 Time Reversal in Quantum mechanics</div><div>13.3 Time Symmetry and Electromagnetic Radiation</div><div>13.4 Conditions for Time and Space Co-Ordination</div><div>13.5 Definition of dynamical reversibility</div><div>13.6 When is a Quantum System Dynamically Reversible?</div><div>13.7 Time and Entropy</div><div>13.7.1 Time Reversal and the Second Law of Thermodynamics</div><div>13.7.2 Entropy Function Defined on Hilbert Spaces?</div><div>13.8 The Arrow of Time and Clocks</div><div>13.8.1 Entropy of Clocks</div><div>13.8.2 Direction of Time without a Universal Clock</div><div>13.9 Time and Big Bang</div><div>13.10 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>14. Identity, Individuation, Indistinguishability and Entanglement</div><div>14.1 Introduction</div><div>14.2 Maxwell-Boltzmann Statistics</div><div>14.3 Fermi-Dirac Statistics</div><div>14.4 Bose-Einstein Statistics</div><div>14.4.1 Elementary Bosons</div><div>14.4.2 Composite Bosons</div><div>14.5 Individuation and Identity of Quantum States</div><div>14.6 Individuation of Quantum Systems</div><div>14.7 Entanglement</div><div>14.8 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>15. Quantum Waves and Indeterminacy</div><div>15.1 Introduction</div><div>15.2 Quantum Systems Propagate as Waves</div><div>15.2.1 Probability Amplitudes</div><div>15.3 Indeterminacy, not Uncertainty!</div><div>15.4 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>16. The Measurement Problem</div><div>16.1 Introduction</div><div>16.2 Von Neumann’s Account of Measurements</div><div>16.3 The Copenhagen view on measurements</div><div>16.4 My Own View - a Collapse Interpretation</div>16.5 Three steps of a measurement<div>16.6 Discreteness of Interactions</div><div>16.7 From Classical to Quantum Mechanics</div><div>16.7.1 Replacing Operators for Variables</div><div>16.7.2 Interaction and Individuation of Quantum States</div><div>16.7.3 Unobserved Interactions</div><div>16.7.4 Measurements of Continuous Observables</div><div>16.8 State Evolution and Time Dependent Hamiltonians</div><div>16.9 A Semi-Formal Derivation of Collapse</div><div>16.10 Summary</div><div><br></div><div>17. What is Spacetime?</div><div>17.1 Introduction</div><div>17.2 The Role of Rods and Clocks in Relativity Theory</div>17.3 GTR- The Relation Between Spacetime Structure and Matter Distribution<div>17.4 Spacetime Functionalism</div><div>17.5 String Theory and Spacetime</div><div>17.5.1 The Dimensionality of Space</div><div>17.5.2 String theory and GTR</div><div>17.6 Summary</div><div><br></div>18. Summary and Conclusions<div><br></div><div>Bibliography</div><div>Index</div>